: Nondemocratic leaders have smaller coalitions and can use the rents (extra resources) created by economic restrictions to buy off their core supporters, often making them more secure rather than less. Onset and Initiation
More likely against democratic targets; less likely against autocracies. 2007. An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onse...
: Senders are more likely to initiate sanctions against states where they believe the political institutions will make the sanctions effective. : Nondemocratic leaders have smaller coalitions and can
: The authors suggest that majoritarian democratic politics may "overproduce" sanctions as a policy tool due to domestic demands from various interest groups within their own large winning coalitions. Summary of Hypotheses Institutional Effect Sanction Success : The authors suggest that majoritarian democratic politics
The 2007 article "," published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution by David Lektzian and Mark Souva , argues that the effectiveness and initiation of economic sanctions depend heavily on the political institutions of the target state. Core Argument: The "Winning Coalition"
Democracies are more frequent senders and tend to target those most vulnerable to economic pressure.
Institutional theories of sanctions combine elements of the punishment and expressive approaches. Like the punishment perspective, Florida State University An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success